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Abstract. This study assesses the intervention against avian influenza in Nigeria. It 
applied a simple compartmental model to define endemic and burn-out scenarios for 
the risk of spread of HPAI in Nigeria. It followed with the derivation of low and high 
mortality risks associated to each scenario. The estimated risk parameters were subse-
quently used to stochastically simulate the trajectory of the disease, had no intervention 
been carried out. Overall, the intervention costs US$ 41 million, which was yearly dis-
bursed in various amounts over the 2006-2010 period. The key output variables (incre-
mental net benefit, disease cost, and benefit cost ratio) were estimated for each ran-
domly drawn risk parameter. With a 12% annual discount rate, the results show that the 
intervention was economically justified under the endemic scenario with high mortality 
risk. On average, incremental benefit under this scenario amounted to US$ 63.7 million, 
incremental net benefit to US$27.2 million, and benefit cost ratio estimated to 1.75. 
Keywords. Avian influenza, infection control, biological risk management, damage 
function, incremental net benefit
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1. Introduction
Nigeria has a poultry industry with about 160 million birds estimated at US$ 250 
million (FDLPCS, 2007).The industry contributes up to 10% to the country’s agricultural 
gross domestic product and accounts for 36% of the country’s total protein intake. The 
overall sector attracts investment and yields a net worth of US$ 1.7 billion a year (FRN, 
2007). The commercial poultry sector represents 15% of the total poultry population and 
is of significant economic importance to the country and the West Africa region because 
of its contribution to employment, food security and livelihoods. However, the sector is 
still hampered by difficulties linked to obsolete infrastructure for animal health, poor dis-
ease surveillance strategy, and weak diagnosis and control systems. These factors put Nige-
ria at a high risk of introduction and spread of trans-boundary animal diseases such as 
the highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) subtype H5N1 as confirmed by the report 
of the technical committee of experts on the prevention and (eventual) control of HPAI 
H5N1 in Nigeria (FDLPCS, 2005). The necessity of this committee’s work was triggered 
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by the enormous and unprecedented social and economic impacts of avian influenza in 
Asia where over 200 million domestic poultry had either died or been destroyed with 175 
people having contracted the infection, of which, 93 had died as a direct result of HPAI 
infection between 2003 and 2005 (World Bank, 2006).
The Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) had developed emergency preparedness 
plans for dealing with any incursion of the disease into Nigeria (FDLPCS, 2006) because 
of the economic significance of poultry farming and the potential for the outbreak of 
becoming a pandemic with incalculable consequences. However, the first wave of out-
breaks, which started in February 2006 lasted for 21 months and created panic among the 
populace. There was significant unease among scientists and policy makers as little was 
known about the disease although the role of migratory bird species of the Anseriformes 
and Charadriiformes as natural reservoirs for the disease had been confirmed (Stallknecht 
and Shane, 1988). Keeler, Berghaus, and Stallknecht (2012) also established that the per-
sistence of virus on surface water depends on the temperature (ambient), degree of salin-
ity (hypothesized), and pH (neutral to slightly basic). However, the case of Nigeria is com-
plicated by common practices such as illegal poaching and trades of wild birds for food 
and medicines and maintaining captive wild birds next to domesticated poultry, which are 
major factors contributing to the spread of the disease (Teru et al., 2012). The fact that 
60% of all poultry produced in Nigeria originate from village extensive and backyard 
intensive production system referred to as “Sector 4” according to FAO classification of 
poultry production systems (FDLPCS, 2007) is also a compounding factor. “Sector 4” is 
the main supplier of birds to retailers, consumers, and live bird markets notwithstanding 
the limited, if at any, application of biosecurity measures (Muteia et al., 2011). 
It was feared that this situation combined with a notable weak infrastructure for 
animal health, disease surveillance, diagnosis and control across sub-Sahara Africa, the 
effects of HPAI escaping the boundaries of Nigeria would be disastrous for the food secu-
rity and livelihoods of millions of people (Gueye, 2007) and catastrophic for the continent 
if it evolved as an influenza pandemic. Such a dire scenario was possible given the virus’ 
high propensity for random mutations and capacity to change in antigenicity, infectivity, 
and virulence (Holmes, 2010; Pfeiffer et al., 2011).
The picture painted above was seriously taken and urgently addressed by the Nigerian 
government. It provided the near-perfect impetus for policy makers to decide to intervene 
based on the precautionary principle. In the immediate aftermath of the initial outbreaks, 
the worst of the fears became increasingly plausible. The disease spread rapidly to 97 local 
government areas in 25 states and the federal capital territory. Four hundred thousand 
birds were culled in the first two months; egg and chicken sales declined by 80% within 
two weeks following the announcement of HPAI outbreaks (OIE, 2007). There was a near 
total boycott of poultry products in the country with all the associated negative effects of 
a zoonotic and trans-boundary disease on the industry (Tiongco, 2009; Beach et al., 2008; 
Akinwumi et al., 2010; Rich and Wanyioke, 2010). At the West African regional level and 
in quick turns, Niger, Cameroon, Benin, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire, all confirmed out-
breaks of the disease (OIE, 2011). These events galvanized the international community 
into action with Nigeria receiving significant in-kind aid materials such as disinfectants, 
protective gears, vehicles and equipment (Perry et al., 2011).
On its part, the FGN began receiving funds from the World Bank through a loan 
contracted to support its effort to minimize the threats posed by H5N1, prepare against 
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influenza pandemic, and prevent further spread of HPAI to other parts of the coun-
try under the Nigeria Avian Influenza Control Project (NAICP) (World Bank, 2006). 
The NAICP had a total of four components: Animal Health (budget US$ 29.2 million), 
Human Health (US$ 18.25 million), Social Mobilization and Strategic Communication 
(US$ 4 million), and Implementation Support/Monitoring and Evaluation (US$ 6.8 mil-
lion). The allocation of funds across these activities let transpire an understanding by the 
FGN for a need to move beyond health issues to successfully deal with the disease. Using 
the case of Vietnam, Herington (2010) argued for the necessity to account for economic, 
political, and social factors in addition to the epidemiological factors in order to design 
the most objective and effective approach to deal with disease outbreaks. It is through 
this process known as securitization that a country could evoke the argument of nation-
al security interest to be able to undertake actions often not consistent with the narrow 
interest of market agents and politicians at the local level (Herington, 2010). Internation-
al perception about the disease may not be enough to undertake actions such as culling 
birds, destroying eggs, and quarantining poultry farms according to Herington (2010). 
Drawing from the cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza 
in China, Wishnick (2010) warned that securitization is not a panacea and advocated for 
a more balanced approach that enlists the public as a partner for the government to be 
successful in implementing its plans. This approach is broadly consistent with the actions 
taken by the FGN to quell HPAI. 
In the entire event, Nigeria suffered two major waves of outbreaks in 2006 and 2007 
with a small and final episode in July 2008 (Figure 1). In all, there were 362 outbreaks that 
led to one human case fatality and the destruction of 1.3 million infected birds for which 
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$5.4 million was paid in compensation to 3,037 affected poultry farms/farmers (World 
Bank, 2010).
The NAICP was implemented from April 2006 to May 2011 during which time US$ 
41 million were disbursed by the World Bank to the project. As the project was ending the 
World Bank commissioned the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) to con-
duct an independent impact assessment of the project to determine the degree to which 
the project outputs have contributed to the achievement of the project development objec-
tives. The objectives of this study are threefold: (1) develop counterfactual scenarios to 
measure the extent to which the intervention had minimized losses; (2) assess the eco-
nomic justification of the intervention; and (3) determine the threshold composite risk 
level necessary to justify the intervention. 
In this article, we first outlined a theoretical framework of disease control to under-
stand the economic foundation of disease risk management and mitigation. Second, we 
presented an assessment of HPAI risk based on observed data to derive the scenarios that 
were considered, followed by a presentation of the data, and a stochastic analysis of HPAI 
risk. We proceeded with the economic assessment of the intervention against HPAI fol-
lowed by a final section on the concluding remarks.
2. Theoretical framework 
Disease outbreaks induce cost due to production losses, untimely slaughters, and 
reduced productivity causing welfare losses at all levels of the supply chain (Wolf, 2005). 
These losses could be mitigated through strategically targeted interventions. Theoretical-
ly, these targeted interventions seek to minimize losses in expected damage from disease 
outbreaks. Accurate assessments of damages caused by animal diseases require integrating 
epidemic and economic models (Paarlberg et al., 2005; Pritchett and Johnson, 2005). Rich 
and Winter-Nelson (2007) applied an integrated epidemiological and economic model to 
study the spatial and temporal impacts of foot-and-mouth outbreak in the southern cone 
of South America. Egbendewe-Mondzozo et al. (2013) applied similar approach with sto-
chastic transmission rate for an ex ante assessment of using vaccination as an option to 
control avian influenza in the U.S. 
Under this framework, the expected damage function could be calculated at the coun-
try level. It is proxied by the expected total (TC) a sum of expected direct (DC) indirect 
(IC), and could be formally defined as follows:
TC (ϕ) = DC (ϕ) +IC (ϕ) (1)
The specification of the direct cost component broadens the deterministic approach 
proposed by Bennett (2003). It contains a component ϕ to indicate the vector of inter-
vention that links expected total cost of the disease, overall risk, and size of the interven-
tion used to reduce risk. Equation (1) is a function of the probability, p(ϕ) of a bird being 
affected. This probability is a composite risk parameter derived as a product of risk of 
spread, s(ϕ), and mortality risk, m(ϕ). It is a function of the intervention cost, r(ϕ). Both 
the composite risk parameter and the cost of intervention are function of the vector of 
ϕ that includes surveillance, culling, carcass disposal, cleaning, compensation, and edu-
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cation, among other things. Under this specification, the optimal composite risk, p φ( )(ϕ) 
under which the intervention would make economic sense could be numerically derived. 
At that point, the marginal cost of an additional unit of intervention equals its marginal 
benefit and the net social welfare gain of the intervention to its incremental net benefit. 
The direct cost refers to the monetary values of physical losses as a result of mortality 
associated with HPAI calculated by applying the respective unitary prices to each category 
of physical losses. These physical losses include chicken death and egg losses (using the 
share of laying hens out of the dead chickens) as a result of the disease and the applied 
control strategies. The expected chicken death L(ϕ) the basis of the expected physical loss-
es is calculated by multiplying the composite risk estimate and the population of Z and 
can be formally expressed as follows:
L φ( )= p φ( )*Z





The expected egg loss is found by multiplying annual production per layer by the 
share of layers out of the expected total dead chickens. The indirect cost involves the rip-
ple effects such as effects of price shocks on supply chain actors, spill-over effects such as 
effects on the tourism sector, and long term macroeconomic effects of the disease (OIE, 
2007). While the direct cost could be easily assessed with a partial budgeting approach, 
the indirect cost proves more complicated to determine. There is a general agreement 
based on the existing body of research on HPAI that the indirect cost of HPAI dwarfs the 
direct cost (OIE, 2007; Diao et al., 2009). There is also an agreement that their measure-
ments require extensive data that may be difficult to obtain, especially in developing coun-
tries (OIE, 2007). Hence, we utilised a ratio that puts the indirect cost at 1.24 times the 
direct cost derived from estimated direct and indirect costs of HPAI in Nigeria in an ex 
ante analysis that used a computable general equilibrium (Diao et al., 2009).
The incremental benefit represents the cost saving accrued to Nigeria as a result of 
the intervention. It is the difference between what would have been the total cost of HPAI 
to Nigeria had no action been taken and what it was under the intervention. The incre-
mental cost corresponds to the World Bank’s yearly disbursements between 2006 and 
2010. The incremental net benefit is obtained by subtracting the incremental cost from the 
incremental benefit. 
3. Risk assessment and scenario derivation
The estimation of economic impacts of HPAI outbreak in Nigeria is based on loss-
es from mortality/culling incurred in the course of the outbreak. The magnitude of these 
losses is assumed to depend on the risk of disease spreading between states and the risk of 
a bird dying from the disease following exposure in the affected states (Figure 2).
There are at least two levels of aggregation between the state and the bird that should 
have been considered (i.e., local government area and village) to minimize making erro-
neous inferences when using aggregated data (state level) to address issues at local level 
(local government and village level). This could not be done because the outbreak dataset 
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used had more reliable information at higher (state) than lower (village) levels. A compos-
ite estimate of the risk of a bird being affected could be obtained by combining the two 
measures of risk shown in Figure 2 and outlined in the theoretical framework. 
Given the high uncertainty associated with the HPAI risk estimates defined above, 
two risk scenarios (i.e., the best and the worst case scenarios) that are expected to enclose 
the plausible risk levels are provided for each risk estimate. The risk of introduction of 
the disease is not considered in this analysis because the focus is on an outbreak that had 
already occurred. Though multiple introductions of the virus might have occurred over 
the three-year period when the outbreak was active, these introductions are not consid-
ered as being independent events since they happened at a period when HPAI epidemic 
was active in many parts of the world.
The risk of spread of HPAI in Nigeria was analyzed using a simple compartmental 
Susceptible-Infectious (SI) model assuming that all newly infected states were infected 
by indirect contact with infectious states during the same wave of the epidemic. This is 
a system of differential equations that calculates the effects of a disease in a population 
by using preceding disease parameters known as transition rates (Rich and Winter-Nel-
son, 2007). Two scenarios were considered: (i) the outbreak burns out due to a reduction 
in the number of susceptible states, and (ii) the outbreak becomes endemic after a short 
peak. The assumption made for the first scenario is that re-stocking is done 90 days after 
culling and adequate biosecurity measures are put in place that will protect a large pro-
portion of the newly introduced birds from getting exposed to the virus. For the second 
scenario, it is assumed that restocking is done routinely after 90 days but inadequate bios-
ecurity measures are implemented. In this case, the replacement stock has an equal chance 
of being exposed to the disease as the indigenous population.  
The model assumes that all newly infected states (C) were infected by indirect con-
tact with infectious states (I) during the same wave of the epidemic. The contact between 
states could be associated with purchases, movements of infected birds, or transfers of 
infectious material (e.g. feaces) via fomites from infected to uninfected villages. Let S be 
the number of susceptible states per day, I the number of infectious states per day, and 
N the total number of states, the number of newly infected states C is given βSI/N. The 
parameter β the transmission coefficient of the disease. It represents the average rate at 
which an infected state infects susceptible state in a day in a population consisting of sus-
ceptible states. The β therefore derived NC/SI (Ward et al., 2009) for each day (t) of the 
epidemic. This model ignores spatial transmission dynamics as it assumes that states had 
similar epidemiological characteristics (defined by HPAI risk factors, contact patterns and 
recovery rates) and were equally at risk of infection at the start of the epidemic. 
The outbreak dataset (NAICP, undated) was, hence, aggregated at the state level in 






Proportion of states 
affected given that 
the country is 
infected (risk of 
spread) 
Probability that a 
bird will be 
affected given that 
a state is infected 
(mortality risk) 
51Assessment of intervention against avian influenza
order to obtain one record/state/phase of the outbreak. The first phase occurred between 
January and August 2006 while the second occurred between November 2006 and Novem-
ber 2007. The duration of α was assumed to be equal to the duration between the dates 
when the outbreak was reported and when depopulation was done at the state level (Bett et 
al., 2014). The transmission coefficients and the duration of infectiousness were estimated 
using the outbreak data set. The transmission coefficient was estimated β = 0.02 and the 
mean duration of infectiousness α = 49 days while the incubation period of the disease, 
was assumed to be γ = 3 days. Henning et al. (2009) reported that incubation period could 
be anywhere between 2 and 14 days. The transmission rate, mean duration of infectious-
ness, incubation period, number of days, say ρ, required before restocking after culling, 
and number of states were used to solve the system of differential equations (3) and (4) for 
the number of susceptible, infected, incubating, and resolved cases, R, at each day (t). The 
prevalence at each day (t) is derived as I/N and the average prevalence over time represents 
the risk of spread of the disease between states. The estimates of the risk of spread over a 1 
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The initial conditions are S0 = N, N = 37, C0 = 0, and R0 = 0. The parameters α, γ, β, 
and ρ remains as previously defined. Figure 3 provides an illustration of the evolution of 
HPAI prevalence under these two scenarios. 
The risk of infection (or mortality risk, as the case fatality rate is 100%) was derived 
using the mean proportions of poultry that died (combining case fatalities and culled 
birds) out of the total population at risk in 2006 and 2007 for the states that had popu-
lation at risk data. The mean proportions obtained were 2% and 1% for 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. Overall, given the high uncertainty associated with the HPAI risk estimates 
defined above, two risk scenarios (i.e., the best and the worst case scenarios) that are 
expected to enclose the plausible risk levels are provided for each risk estimate. 
4. Data consideration
This study utilises both factual data and projected data under the counterfactual sce-
narios. The factual data include outbreak numbers, number of affected states, number of 
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dead chickens, number of culled chickens, compensation cost, and cost of culling and dis-
posal per bird were compiled by NAICP and available on the project’s website at www.
aicpnigeria.org. The production and price data are from FAO (FAO, 2010). Table 1 illus-
trates the data used in the study.
Projected mortalities under the counterfactual scenarios are derived using the disease 
risk parameters as described in Table 2. About 85% of the flocks that was affected by HPAI 
in Nigeria were layers (Fasina et al., 2007). The rest was mainly comprised of broilers and 
village chickens. The expected physical losses in egg and broiler and their expected mone-
tary values were calculated using these parameters accordingly with the composite risk esti-
mate (i.e., product of risk of spread and mortality risk) and the population at risk. 
5. Stochastic Analysis
Outbreak data at state level were used to simulate an empirical distribution of the 
mortality risk. The risk of spread was also simulated using a truncated normal distribu-
tion generated from the previously described average risk spread estimates. Both the risk 
of spread and the risk of a bird becoming infected were assumed to evolve stochastically 
over the studied period. The simulation was conducted using SIMETAR, an excel add-in 
software that randomly draws from the distribution of the risks of spread and the mor-
tality risk to iteratively solve for the key output variables. Richardson et al. (2004) pro-
vide detailed information about the algorithm. Figures4 and 5 illustrate the distribution of 
risk of spread and risk of infection, respectively. The stochastic averages of risk of spread 
were 0.2746 and 0.1663 under the endemicity and burn-out scenarios, respectively. The 
stochastic averages of infection risk were 0.0088 and 0.0174for the low and high mortality 
risk scenarios, respectively. 
All key output variables (disease cost, incremental benefit, incremental net benefit, 
and benefit cost ratio) were stochastically determined. The resulting outputs were a set of 
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Table 1. Data sources.
Names Value Sources
Disease Parameters Number of outbreaks 320 NAICP (undated)
Number of states affected 25 NAICP (undated)
Mean incubation period 
(days)
3 Assumed. See Henning, 
Pfeiffer, and Vu (2009)
Mean duration of 
infectiousness (days)
49 Assumed. See Bett et al. 
(2014) at village level
Case fatality rate 100 WHO (2011)
Transmission rate 0.02 Calculated from outbreak 
data
Mortality risk 0.01 and 0.02 Calculated from outbreak 
data
Risk of spread 0.13 and 0.27 Calculated from outbreak 
data
Population affected Number of susceptible Varies year-to-year Calculated
Number of infected Varies year-to-year Calculated
Number of dead See Table 3 NAICP (undated) for 
factual data and derived 
for counterfactuals
Number of culled See Table 3 NAICP (undated) for 
factual data and derived 
for counterfactuals 
Production parameters Chicken losses Vary year-to-year Calculated based on 
epidemiological and 
production parameters 
Egg losses Vary year-to-year Calculated based on 
the share of layers 
(85%) among affected 
bird (Fasina, 2007) and 
epidemiological and 
production parameters
Price of chicken Varies year to year. US$ 
2.76/head on average
FAO(2010)





Compensation cost US$ 1.96/head OIE (2007)
Cost of culling and 
disposal per bird
US $ 1.00 OIE (2007)
Control cost per bird US $ 0.38 OIE (2007)
Other parameter Ratio indirect to direct 
cost
1.24 Derived from Diao et al. 
(2009)
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500 possible solutions from which parameter of central tendencies and distribution were 
derived and presented. 
6. Disease cost and economic assessment of intervention
Table 3 presents a comparison between observed and expected birds’ mortalities 
from culling and the disease itself under the four previously outlined scenarios. These 
estimates were based on the stochastic averages of the spread and infection risk param-
eters. The results show that the additional number of birds that would have been saved 
by the intervention between 2008 and 2010 under the burn-out scenario would be 
46,960and 93,794 for the low and high mortality paths, not significant enough to warrant 
the investment from a financial standpoint. Hence, the analysis mainly focused on the 
two scenarios of endemicity. 
The descriptive statistics on the key output variables in Table 4 indicate that had the 
intervention not been carried out, the average cost of HPAI to the Nigerian economy 
over the 5-year period (2006-2010) would have amounted to US$ 144.97 million under 
the high mortality path. Studies such as Fasina (2008) estimated the total cost of HPAI 
at US$ 244 million for a mild case scenario whereby 10% of the commercial flock would 
be affected and US$690 for a severe scenario. You and Diao (2007) estimated the direct 
cost at US$ 250 million under a worst case scenario that involves the disease spreading 
along the two major flyways and between US$ 48 and US$ 52 million for a best case 
scenario where the disease would be confined to a single flyway. These studies deal with 
ex ante analysis of HPAI. The distribution of the potential cost of the disease was also 
evaluated. As indicated in Table 4, there was 30% chance that the economic damage 
caused by HPAI would be above US$ 173.61 million under the most disastrous scenario 
and 90% chance that it would be greater than US$ 53.36 million. The incremental ben-
efit of the intervention over the five-year period would amount to US$ 63.7 million. The 
incremental net benefit is obtained by subtracting the Bank disbursements from the net 
benefit, which yielded US$ 27.22 million. This amount is the net gain of the interven-
tion. The results in Table 4 indicate that there is 40% chance that the intervention would 
not lead to positive incremental benefit. The distribution of the generated incremental 
net benefit of the intervention ranged from a minimum of -US$65.10 million to a maxi-
mum of US$702.33 million. The derived incremental benefit and the cost of the interven-
tion are used to calculate the benefit cost ratio of the project. The average benefit cost 
Table 2. Composite risk estimates for the various risk scenarios considered.
Scenario Risk estimate Composite 
estimateSpread Mortality Spread Mortality
Burn-out Low 0.13 0.01 0.0013
Burn-out High 0.13 0.02 0.0026
Endemic Low 0.27 0.01 0.0027
Endemic High 0.27 0.02 0.0054
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ratio amounts to 1.75 (Table 4). It indicates for the endemic scenario with high mortal-
ity path, the intervention would have made economic sense. However, there is no cer-
tainty to the economic justification, as it is determined by the magnitude of the risk of 
bird infection in affected states. In any case, as illustrated in Table 4, there is more than 
50% chance that the investment would be economically justified under the endemic sce-
nario with high mortality path. Furthermore, there is 15% chance that the benefit cost 
ratio would be above 3.86, 10% chance that it would be above 5.36, and 5% chance that 
it would reach at least 8.79. Results of the economic justification of the project should be 
interpreted with care. For instance, the diagnostic capability of the Nigerian veterinary 
public health service has improved under the intervention, the diagnostic laboratories 
have been upgraded, and the morale of veterinarians in public sector has been boosted 
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as a result of their performance during the outbreaks. Currently these veterinarians are 
better trained and equipped to deal with HPAI and other diseases than they were before 
the outbreaks (Perry et al., 2011). These are referred to as preventive spillover benefits by 
Gramig and Wolf (2007). These benefits are difficult to quantify in a cost benefit analysis 
framework although documented in the assessment of the intervention, which call for 
more caution in the interpretation of the results. 
A breakeven analysis was conducted to find the minimum HPAI risks (of spread and 
of infection) that would justify the investment. Various combinations of risk of spread and 
risk of bird infection led to the threshold benefit cost ratio, as the two parameters simul-
taneously determine losses. Notwithstanding, our findings indicate that a composite risk 
estimate at 0.006 would be necessary to cause economic damage high enough to justify 
the intervention. This would correspond to an infection risk of 0.022 under the endemic 
scenario, considering the disease is already present in the country. At breakeven risk level, 
the disease would have caused economic damages amounting to US$ 118 million over the 
five-year period.
Table 3. Observed and projected mortalities under the counterfactual scenarios (thousand birds).
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Factual(a)
  Died 612 135 2 0 0
Culled 405 360 3 0 0
  Total 1,017 496 5 0 0
Counterfactual scenarios(b)  
Burn-out Low Died 612 135 46 23 11
  Culled 405 77 37 19 9
  Total 1,017 212 83 42 21
     
Burn-out High Died 612 184 90 45 22
  Culled 405 151 74 37 18
  Total 1,017 335 163 82 41
     
Endemic Low Died 612 155 151 151 151
  Culled 405 127 124 124 124
  Total 1,017 282 274 274 274
     
Endemic High Died 612 304 296 296 296
  Culled 405 250 243 243 243
  Total 1,017 554 540 540 540
Notes: (a) Monthly distribution of the observed mortalities is presented in Appendix 1. (b) Expected 
mortalities are obtained by multiplying population at risk with the risk of spread and the mortality 
risk. The number of culled birds is derived from the susceptible birds that have not died. The expected 
egg loss is found by multiplying annual production per layer by the share of layers out of the expect-
ed total dead birds (see Table 1 for more information).
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7. Conclusion
Outbreak data in Nigeria were used to simulate the risk of spread of HPAI to states 
in Nigeria and the risk of bird infection. These risk parameters were applied to assess 
the potential cost of HPAI to Nigeria under four scenarios (burn-out with low mortality, 
burn-out with high mortality, endemic with low mortality, and endemic with high mor-
tality) had the intervention not been carried out. Our findings indicate that for the two 
burn-out scenarios, the number of birds that would have been saved would not have been 
enough to warrant the investment of US$ 41 million. This conclusion, for the burn-out 
scenarios, is purely financial as it discounts the possibility of loss of human lives and the 
application of precautionary principle informed by the poor state of infrastructure and 
known weaknesses of the Veterinary Service in Nigeria at the time of the outbreak. From 
a global view point, the potential evolution of the disease to a pandemic could have been 
enough to warrant such an investment given concerns within the international commu-
nity on the high likelihood of the disease becoming endemic in Nigeria.
Nevertheless, the analyses show that under the scenario where the disease became 
endemic with high mortality risk, the investment would generate incremental net ben-
efit significant enough to justify the investment. In reality, the Nigeria HPAI outbreaks 
claimed more than 1.3 million birds and could not be classified under any of the two 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics and percentile distribution of the effects of intervention against HPAI on 
key output variables over 2006-2010 under the high mortality path.











Stochastic average 0.27 0.02 144.97 63.70 27.22 1.75
Standard deviation 0.06 0.02 115.99 115.99 115.99 3.18
5% 0.18 0.00 52.94 -28.33 -64.81 0.00
10% 0.20 0.00 53.36 -27.91 -64.39 0.00
30% 0.24 0.00 55.14 -26.14 -62.62 0.00
40% 0.26 0.00 64.40 -16.87 -53.35 0.00
50% 0.27 0.02 124.20 42.93 6.45 1.18
60% 0.29 0.02 150.53 69.26 32.78 1.90
70% 0.31 0.02 173.61 92.34 55.86 2.53
75% 0.31 0.03 190.12 108.85 72.37 2.98
80% 0.32 0.03 201.70 120.43 83.95 3.30
85% 0.33 0.03 222.25 140.98 104.50 3.86
90% 0.35 0.04 276.87 195.60 159.12 5.36
95% 0.37 0.07 401.91 320.64 284.16 8.79
Note: The results presented in each column should be interpreted separately. They are based on the 
500 possible solutions. The risk parameters and the benefit cost ratio are unitless while cost of inac-
tion, incremental benefit, and incremental net benefit are in US$ million over five year period with 
2006 as base year. A 12% discount rate was applied. The rate is consistent with that currently applied 
by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (CBN, 2012). The stochastic averages of yearly values of key out-
put variables are presented in Appendix 2. 
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burn-out scenarios explored in this paper. Similarly, the outbreaks did not persist with 
high mortality as the last one occurred in July 2008. If the intervention is perceived to 
have helped averting the endemic and high mortality scenario, then the benefit would 
have by far exceeded the cost, hence the investment would be highly justified. There also 
are multiple positive externalities that are difficult to account in the calculations of the 
benefit of the intervention. For example, the investment helped Nigeria improve its health 
service delivery infrastructure and strengthened its public health and veterinary services 
capacity in biosecurity protocols and communications to deal with disease outbreaks of 
significant magnitude. So, the lessons learnt from this intervention, including the induced 
behavioral changes within the populace and the acquired knowledge of what to do when 
confronted with similar situations in the future, are incalculable. From the financial, eco-
nomic and welfare standpoints also outlined in this paper, an overall conclusion could be 
reached that the intervention was useful.
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Dead Culled Dead Culled Dead Culled
January 63,166 92,692 35,582 107,915 0 0 299,355
February 59,087 100,539 7,456 47,592 0 0 214,674
March 3,616 14,920 2,754 9,944 0 0 31,234
April 329,549 44,128 168 462 0 0 374,307
May 3,443 10,946 734 1,350 0 0 16,473
June 18,108 8,626 8,735 42,736 0 0 78,205
July 7,409 13,910 23,970 54,179 1,913 2,587 103,968
August 47,703 3,968 30,189 62,178 0 0 144,038
September 3,004 4,000 3,134 10,736 0 0 20,874
October 1,402 2,486 573 1,821 0 0 6,282
November 58,528 82,600 8,439 18,296 0 0 167,863
December 17,314 25,988 4,606 3,030 0 0 50,938
Total 612,329 404,803 126,340 360,239 1,913 2,587 1,508,211
Appendix 2. Yearly discounted stochastic averages of key output variables of the intervention against 




2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Incremental cost 20.00 5.32 7.31 3.34 0.49 36.48
Incremental benefit -3.55 0.28 24.29 22.32 20.34 63.70
Incremental net benefit -23.55 -5.03 16.98 18.98 19.85 27.22
Note: The figures are stochastic averages of discounted yearly key output variables (except for incre-
mental cost). A 12% discount rate was applied with 2006 as base year. 

